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In the years immediately following their independence,
the governments of many developing countries viewed
with suspicion, and even hostility, the operations
within their territories of the multinational cor-
porations (MNC5). Amongst such MNCs, none were
viewed with greater suspicion than those involved in
mining. Mining is a business which often gives rise to
rough expressions of emotion - irreplaceable natural
resources are being extracted, large investments are
made, numerous and highly organised work forces are
involved, the pricing of the product is uncertain and
transfer pricing often suspected. Charges of
'exploitation' come easily to the throats of local
factions and, if because the resources are exhausted or
for reasons of low prices, the mine and its associated
plant have to shut down, large numbers of workers
will be rendered unemployed - often in remote areas
where alternative employment is not in prospect.
Such potent mixtures of motives led to the
establishment of mineral state enterprises in many
developing countries soon after their independence.
Control over the strategic heights of the economy: the
need to learn the business: localisation of management
and employees: maximisation of revenues and foreign
exchange earnings - all these, as well as suspicion and
hostility could be cited as reasons. Appraised in
comparative tranquillity, the experience of the past 20
years with operations of state mineral corporations
should enable us now to identify more clearly what in
practice were their goals and their achievements. Have
they served the purposes which developing country
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governments had in mind for them? Or have they been
costly and inefficient failures? Or have they achieved
some objectives but only at the expense of others? Or
are we in a position to say, as Rod Sims (1985) has
argued in a recent issue of Natural Resources Forum,'
that other mechanisms (such as progressive parti-
cipation arrangements and new forms of taxes and
royalties) now enable host country governments to
achieve those that were ever realistic amongst those
original objectives in a safer and more effective way?
Or perhaps expropriations and nationalisations of
enterprises in the mining sector occur in waves - a
spate of them when prices are high or immediately
after independence, followed by a slackening off and
even some privatisation as disillusionment with the
conduct of parastatals becomes more widespread? Or
could there be other reasons for the apparent spirit of
reconciliation between government and the mining
MNCs which is now apparent in several developing
countries?
The four publications discussed here fit neatly
together. Carnegie in OutlookforMineral Commodities
looks at how the location of the mining and processing
of the world's leading non-ferrous metals has changed
over the past 20 years and speculates as to how those
changes may continue in the future. The conclusion is
that the developing countries are likely to increase
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their proportionate share of production, processing,
fabricating and trade in most of such minerals.
Walrond and Kumar, as their title indicates, look at
the Options for Developing Countries in Mining
Development, although their treatment is not as
consistently wide as this might suggest. Radetzki looks
in detail at one such option, namely the creation of
'State Mineral Enterprises' but argues that this
particular form, although much used in the 1960s and
l970s, may not spread as rapidly in future. The
Garnaut and Emerson report contains a scholarly
analysis of the taxation regimes in an area where
mineral production is likely to go on expanding.
This review article proceeds as follows. I summarise
Carnegie's argument in order to set the scene.
Walrond and Kumar's 'Options' are considered in
somewhat more detail, as much to survey the contents
of their book as to weigh the merits of the different
policies available. The bulk of the article is given over
to considering Radetzki's appraisal of the performance
and prospect of mining parastatals. In looking at the
Garnaut and Emerson report I consider whether
Radetzki's analysis - if accepted - might lead to a
wider adoption of their own proposals.
Carnegie's Outlookfor Mineral Commodities
Sir Roderick Carnegie is chairman of the Australian
mining giant ConZinc-Rio Tinto of Australia CRA.2
His study for the Group of Thirty looks at how the
location of mineral production, smelting, refining and
fabricating has been shifting and discusses what
further shifts may be anticipated in the future.
Between 1965 and 1980, developing countries
succeeded in increasing their share of world mine
production of copper, iron ore and nickel, held onto
their shares of lead and zinc production and suffered a
decline in market share only in bauxite - largely
because of the massive increase in Australia's market
share. Carnegie's expectation is that these trends will
continue, with OECD production (other than in
Canada and Australia) tending to be replaced by that
from developing countries. My own rider to that
proposition would be that if growth in world output is
slow the rate of change in market shares will also be
slow, particularly if the use of scrap is taken into
account. It is only if the demand for minerals increases
enough for the opening of a substantial number of new
mines to be required that we will see a significant rate
of change in market shares.
Table 1, containing figures adapted from World Bank
sources shows how percentage shares in total world
mine production has changed for six major minerals
2 CRA is 52.3 per Cent owned by RTZ, but the British company has
agreed to reduce its holding in CRA to below 50 per Cent sometime
in the future.
between 1965 and 1980 and provides an estimate of
projected shares for 1995.
But these are not the only changes that Carnegie
foresees or postulates. Because of their relatively
unadvanced and simple economic structures, a given
rate of growth in output within developing countries
gives rise to a significantly faster rate of growth in
demand for minerals and metals than would occur in a
more industrialised economy. Developing countries
are therefore likely to become not only greater
producers of minerals, but greater consumers of them
as well. Indeed the second process will help to fuel the
first. It will also encourage (and assist) developing
country governments to take measures that will locate
more of the smelting, refining and even fabricating
within their own economies. They will thus hope to
capture more of the downstream 'value added' from
mineral production as well as enhancing employment
and the development of skills.
Three other changes will surely occur in time,
although it may be questioned to what extent they will
come about by 1995. There seems no reason to
suppose that some of the major Third World mining
enterprises will not themselves develop into strong
multinationals. A second change could involve a shift
in the control of the trade and transportation of
minerals. And a third must - in time - see a reform
(and, one hopes, an improvement) in the way in which
minerals and metal are priced. It is 20 years since I first
heard wild-eyed Professor Mars propound his scheme
for a CIPEC 'Virgin Metal Exchange' to replace the
LME, with information on bargains being bounced
around the world off satellites and prices being flashed
up simultaneously on large screens in Lusaka,
Kinshasa, Santiago and Lima. Any such scheme seems
further away today than it did in 1965. But every time I
accompany a group of developing country visitors to
the LME so that they can learn how their copper
contracts get priced, I come away with the feeling that
however valid the system might be for equating
demand and supply in a residual market, it is not one
producers are likely to tolerate forever for the pricing
of their major export.
Wairond and Kumar's OptionsforDeveloping
Countries
The book by Walrond and Kumar3 is the latest of the
30 or so contributions on this subject made by those
who have worked with the Technical Assistance
Group (TAG) of the Commonwealth Secretariat.
Aspects or ingredients of 'the Commonwealth
Regime' now feature in the mining codes and taxation
arrangements of many countries around the world,
not just those within the Commonwealth.
This part of this article has been adapted from a book review
prepared for the Journal of Development Studies.
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Table 1
Percentage shares in total mine production
(tons of contained metal) by economic regions
The book itself lies somewhere between a textbook for
students and a handbook for practitioners. Its earlier
sections deal with the organisation and administration
of the mining sector - by which is meant the
regulatory system designed to cover the full sequence
of reconnaissance, exploration, prospecting, mine
development and mining operations for both large
mines and small and for a range of different minerals.
The middle sections deal with the design and
administration of different fiscal and financial regimes
and discuss the purpose and merits of the various
charges that may be levied. The underlying
assumption in these sections is that 'the principal
economic justification for the various levels (of
charges) is to capture the bulk of the resource rent
generated by (the resource's) exploitation, but without
affecting operational efficiency or discouraging
investment'. One whole chapter in this section is
devoted to an analysis of the impact of different
regimes (where a regime is understood to be composed
of a combination of different financial charges) upon
mines displaying different characteristics by means of
the use of computer models. A third section deals with
the issues that are likely to arise in the negotiation of
mineral development agreements, and this is followed
by a brief summary and conclusions. What enriches
the discussion - and renders it more useful to the
practitioner - is that virtually every issue is illustrated
by reference to the administrative provisions and
regimes prevailing in eight different countries, namely
Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Zambia, Botswana, Papua
New Guinea, Perak (Malaysia), Quebec (Canada),
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I - Industrial economies; D - Developing economies; CF - Centrally planned economies
Source: adapted from World Bank
and Western Australia.
For the developed countries with which they are
concerned - most of them, it will be noted, the
smaller ones - Walrond and Kumar assert that 'the
joint-participation approach' between a foreign
investor (or operator) and the host country
government (or other local interests) has become 'the
dominant trend' and their guide book seems to assume
that this will (and probably should) continue to be the
case. Often, of course, the domestic participation will
be through a state mineral enterprise of the kind
described and analysed by Radetzki. There is a further
assumption that any major mineral project will
require the negotiation of a special agreement, but that
any such agreement should fit into a carefully
prepared legal framework with the values of only a
limited number of chosen variables being negotiable in
respect of a specific project. The authors have some
wise words to say about such negotiations and on how
most pragmatically to interpret the sensitive issue of
sovereignty over mineral resources:
'The negotiation process is just the beginning, and
perhaps the easiest part of the whole project cycle.
The state must develop its own capability through
its tax authorities, mining administration, traïning
and business acumen, to first monitor the activities
of the company and then, more importantly, to
engage in true partnership, as among equals .
Sovereignty should then best be construed in terms
of the state's ability to manipulate the conversion









Copper 39 45 16 31 49 20 25 51 24
Lead 46 34 21 45 33 21 43 35 22
Zinc 57 27 16 50 28 22 51 29 20
Iron Ore 44 29 27 34 38 28 28 42 30
Bauxite 16 67 17 34 55 11 32 56 12
Nickel 70 9 21 47 30 23 40 37 22
Actual Projected
Radetzki' s State Mineral Enterprises
Let us approach Radetzki by way of his conclusions.
These he presents as being 'a set of plausible
hypotheses that have been derived from general
empirical observation and economic analysis and that
are supported by the case study material but that
remain to be formally validated'. The conclusions are
five. First conclusion; that the widespread nationali-
sations of recent decades have reduced mineral output
and raised prices compared to what would have
prevailed under uninterrupted private MNC regimes,
but that this market impact should diminish as state-
owned firms gain experience. The transition process,
however, may take 10-20 years in individual cases.
Second conclusion; that the takeover by state
enterprises does permanently raise production costs,
because their managements are under less pressure to
keep costs down and because of the pursuit by such
mining parastatals of certain social objectives, often
rather muddled in their definition. For the richer
mines, these tendencies will absorb part - possibly a
major part - of the mineral rent. For the more
marginal ventures, it is likely to mean that the state
enterprise will need regular subsidies. Third conclusion;
that the increasing importance of state-controlled
ventures in Third World mining is likely to result in
greater medium-run price instability because state
firms are less flexible in adjusting capacity utilisation,
especially downwards, to cyclical variations in
demand. Fourth conclusion; nationalisations have
permanently reduced the degree of vertical integration
in the production, processing and trading in most
mineral products. The consequent broadening of the
arms-length markets for such products should
contribute to price stability in the non-captive trade
even if individual firms henceforth suffer from greater
revenue instability. Fifth conclusion; the private
sector's share of world markets in the minerals under
study has shrunk and may shrink even more but it is
unlikely to disappear (and may even recover) (i) because
the fashion for Third World nationalisations (and the
reasons for them) seem to be on the decline; (ii)
because parastatals' operations and investments are
less cost-efficient than those of the private sector;
because governments' taste for (and ability to
offer) endless subsidies seems to be on the wane; and
because governments' ability to raise finance for
further investment in mineral production in the
medium future may be even more constrained than
that of the private sector.
There is thus plenty there to get one's teeth into. So let
us go back and look at Radetzki's evidence and
method. The book starts with the undeniable assertion
that since the l950s state ownership of developing
countries' metallic mineral industries has undergone a
sizable expansion. Forty years ago government equity
holdings in such industries were insignificant; today,
such holdings constitute about half the metallic
mineral production capacity in the Third World. The
minerals with which the book is concerned are copper,
bauxite/alumina/aluminium, iron ore, tin (which four
minerals together comprise two-thirds of the value of
all metal minerals in the world economy), lead and
zinc, cobalt, chromium and molybdenum - nearly all
of them industries in which a high degree of obligopoly
has customarily prevailed in the sense that, at least at
the processing stage, the largest ten companies in each
industry have controlled anything from 50 per cent to
97 per cent of Western world capacity (p5). One of the
more interesting, but perhaps more questionable
assumptions that Radetzki makes is that as state
enterprises in the mineral sector become more
experienced they will tend to reproduce the same
degree of 'producer coordination' that characterïsed
the industries when they were dominated by a handful
of the larger multinational corporations.
Table 2 here reproduces (in abbreviated form) data
which Radetzki displays to illustrate the degree of
developing government ownership in three major
mineral industries in 1981. For bauxite, LDC capacity
constituted 58.4 per cent of total 'western world'
capacity in that year. For copper, the comparable
figure was 52.7 per cent. For iron ore, the actual
production in 1981 was 40.0 per cent of 'western
world' production (p20). The table is suggestive in
other ways. It shows that the nearer one gets to the
market, the greater the proportion of capacity tends to
be controlled within consumer countries. It also shows
how successful (if that is the right word) the big five in
the aluminium industry have been in separating the
control of alumina production from that of either
bauxite mining or of the smelting of aluminium.
A chapter of Radetzki's book is devoted to
'Motivations for Establishing State Mineral Enter-
prises' but such motives may be presumed to be
familiar to Bulletin readers. More interesting are the
lists of particular mining companies throughout the
western world with significant government ownership
and the three case studies (tin in Indonesia; iron ore in
Venezuela; copper in Zambia) which comprise the
latter part of the book. The growth to predominance
of state controlled capacity in LDC mining has
resulted from the combination of three different series
of events. These have been (i) the nationalisations or
partial nationalisations - of (usually foreign owned)
private firms, often by recently independent govern-
ments; (ii) the expansion of capacity by existing state-
controlled companies, and (iii) substantial government
participation in joint ventures with mining multi-
nationals in the development of new capacity.
Consideration of these series of events - and analysis
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Table 2
Government Ownership Positions in Three Major Mineral Industries 1981
I Figures for aluminium are for 1980
2 Figures for iron ore are based on production and not on capacity
Defined as 5 per cent and upwards of total equity
of what caused them - leads Radetzki guardedly to
suggest that 'the fast-growth phase of state-ownership'
may now have come to an end. He cites as reasons 'the
major adjustments to rectify unfavourable colonial
conditions (have) been completed', 'socialist leanings
in developing countries appear less in vogue' and
'pragmatism has taken precedence over ideology'. If
these judgements are correct, what we are likely to see
in the next phase is a maturing in the conduct of
state-owned enterprises (i.e. greater professional and
technical competence internally and acting externally
more like the old-fashioned companies), a greater role
for national, indigenous private ownership, and
amicable joint-venture arrangements between LDC
governments and those old black-and-white-era
villains, the mining MNCs, in the development of new
projects or perhaps even in the management of
existing ones.
Radetzki's method involves him next in identifying the
specific characteristics which are likely to characterise
state mineral enterprises ('a difference between the
average private firm and the average state enterprise
does exist and can be identified' (p38)), then
examining the behavioural consequences of those
characteristics and in particular the likely impact of
that behaviour on international mineral markets. On
the characteristics of state enterprises he generalises as
follows:
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(j) goals are likely to be less clearly specified than is
usual with private enterprise because the multiple
objectives of state-owned firms reflect conflicting
public needs and political pressures;
there is likely to be 'a hazy relationship' between
top management and owners which is likely to assure
management of tenure - even if it is not efficient
- unless the managers fall out of political favour or
break some bureaucratic rule;
state enterprises operate under less stringent
with financial constraints than is usual private firms
and have commonly had access to capital on
advantageous terms;
state enterprises have - in government - a
saviour of last resort that will come to rescue them in
circumstances in which a private firm would either be
taken over or would have to go out of business.
These generalisations will be recognised as being fairly
standard conclusions from burgeoning literature
about state enterprises that has come out of the United
States in the last few years. They lead onto
'behavioural patterns typical of state enterprises'
which are equally standard, indeed at this stage
Radetzki purports to be doing no more than surveying
the economic literature. Such patterns include










Total capacity (000 tons) 54,000 6,530 2,190 4,120 3,340 2,580 216,900
Per cent of capacity with
significant government
ownership3 71.1 54.9 60.3 73.0 75.5 82.6 94.7
Per cent of equity held by
government 41.1 21.1 44.7 57.8 64.0 67.6 61.8
Per cent of capacity with
majority government
ownership 33.3 12.3 45.6 62.0 72.9 77.0 n.a.
enterprise goals, low pressure to minimise enterprise
costs, bureaucratic organisation, high capital intensity,
and over-investment in capacity. Broadly, however, it
can be said that Radetzki's own observations and his
case studies tend to confirm the appositeness of the
characteristics and behaviour patterns of state
enterprises that the American literature has identified.
Private Multinational will:
have inefficiency limited by owners;
exhibit capacity utilisation which will be high in
booms, low in slumps;
behave oligopolistically, e.g. collude with rivals;
have investments constrained by financial capacity;
use high proportion of equity finance which is
vulnerable to expropriation, nationalisation,
spoliation, etc.;
rate investments by post-tax DCF;
favour wide geographical spread;
upgrade prospect if it promotes vertical integration;
downgrade prospects (or even ignore them) for
reasons of 'political risk'.
A number of other ingredients have to be stirred into
this mixture. One is the familiar - and fraught -
argument concerning the extent and quality of
exploration undertaken by state enterprises. Radetzki
quotes Giraud as having shown that state enterprises
spent much less than private firms on mineral
exploration in the 1970s but argues that this may have
been partly compensated for by exploration in
developing countries undertaken by other agencies,
such as the UN Revolving Fund. The quality issue
('The mine-finder is a very exceptional animal who
will not work for bureaucracies') is not extensively
discussed. A second ingredient is whether it is safe to
assume for the purposes of Radetzki's analysis that
'inexperienced' state mineral firms - mainly those
TABLE OF CONTRASTS
Private and State Enterprises Contrasted
From here it is but a few short steps to the conclusions
which I summarised at the beginning of this review.
But not all the steps are easy ones. There is a fairly
detailed comparison made of how a foreign private
sector firm may be expected to act by contrast with a
state-owned mineral enterprise, and I have thought it
convenient to encapsulate these comparisons in the
following Table of Contrasts.
State Enterprise will:
have inefficiencies much less curtailed;
be much less flexible in adjusting capacity
utilisation;
collude less than the MNCs, although this may
change as parastatals get more 'mature';
in the past, have found finance easier and cheaper,
but 3W debt problem may change that;
use more loan finance which, in the past has not
usually been valuable to repudiation etc.;
rank investments by social DCF returns which give
more weight to forex earnings, employment
creation, use of local inputs, regional balance,
environmental protection;
concentrate exploration and investment in own
country;
probably be less concerned with integration;
ignore political risk considerations ('You don't
protect yourself against yourself").
that have taken over existing industries by nationali-
sation and then shown their inexperience by running
them inefficiently - will eventually grow into
'mature' state enterprises, and so behave like them.
Radetzki assumes that they will, but other hypotheses
could also be formulated. There is a distinction too
between parastatals which are managed badly, and
those which perform badly because the entire
economy in which they are operating is in disarray.
That can be a relevant factor also in trying to assess
future behaviour.
In assessing the impact upon international markets of
the proliferation of Third World state mining
organisations, it should be obvious that not all the
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factors noted in our 'Table of Contrasts' operate in the
same direction. In particular there are two issues upon
which the judgement that one arrives at must depend
upon the weight accorded to the different factors -
and these, of course, may change over time. The first
issue is whether the disregard by state enterprises of
fiscal burdens and political risks in their assessment of
likely returns from potential projects implies that state
ownership will lead to a shift of investment flows
towards those mineral-rich developing countries
which the mining MNCs have tended to avoid recently
because of severe fiscal regimes or perceived political
risk. On this point, Radetzki limits himself to
observing that this will only happen 'if the increase in
perceived returns resulting from the state enterprises'
method of evaluating projects exceeds any possible
reduction in returns [surely he means any assessed
reduction) due to less efficient management of
exploration programmes and higher costs of operating
mineral ventures that are typical of publicly owned
firms'. (Note how what was earlier an hypothesis
about inefficiency has by p58 become an assertion!)
The second unresolved issue concerns whether the
unwillingness of the state-owned sector to cut capacity
utilisation in response to declines in demand will or
will not outweigh the price-stabilising effects of
widening the market. Radetzki himself is shrewdly
agnostic on this point, seeming to suggest that in order
to given an answer about the past a complex
econometric analysis would be needed for which data
in usable form do not exist - and even then that the
answer obtained might not be a safe guide to the
future. He does however quote some interesting
studies and figures. The study (by L. S. Powers,
'Instability in the Copper, Aluminium, Tin, and Iron
and Steel Markets' published in Materials and Society,
no 3, 1981) concludes that developing countries on
average have been somewhat more stable (i.e. less
flexible) than industrialised countries in their output
of copper, aluminium, tin and iron/steel in the 1950-
77 period. The trouble with that evidence, as Radetzki
points out, is that some of the curtailments in
developing country production that may have seemed
statistically to have contributed to that stability (i.e.
the falls in production in Zambia and Zaire) were not
intended by government policy at all.
The figures that I found interesting relate to the
response of different groups of copper-producing
countries to major changes in the copper price in the
years between 1950 and 1974. The average copper
price in the 1964-74 period was (we are told) $1.85/lb
(in constant 1981 dollars), 60 per cent above the
$1.15/lb average for the preceding 11 years. During
the period 1950-60 while the price was comparatively
low, the four CIPEC countries (Chile, Peru, Zaire and
Zambia) expanded their production on average by
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6.2 per cent a year. During the period 1960-74, while
prices were much higher, the same four countries'
average annual rate of increase fell to 2.7 per cent.
Meanwhile, western world output outside CIPEC rose
by an annual average of 3.6 per cent during the earlier
period and by an annual average of 4.7 per cent over
the later period. Radetzki concludes from this that the
exceptionally high copper prices in the 1964-74 period
'can be ascribed in some degree to the inability of
Chile, Peru, Zaire and Zambia to expand capacity
after partial or total nationalisations'. It could also be
argued, apropos the earlier point, that the nationali-
sations diverted investment away from the countries
where those nationalisations had occurred, although
that is to imply that investment per se is the main
determinant of trend output, which may not always be
the case.
Garnaut and Emerson on Mining Taxation in
the ES CAP Region
The Garnaut/Emerson study, like that by Walrond
and Kumar, looks at the taxation applicable to mining
in four countries in the ESCAP region (Australia,
Indonesia, Papua New Guinea and the Philippines)
and also appraises the respective regimes partly by
way of applying them to four simulated operations.
Beyond that, the differences between the two studies
are more significant than the similarities.
Garnaut/Emerson are more detailed, more academic
and more thorough. Apart from describing optimality
in terms of encouraging mineral investment and
maximising government's share of mineral rents, the
study investigates several more detailed criteria,
noticeably neutrality and likely stability. Their work
explicitly covers oil field operations, which the other
three studies largely exclude. And the study contains a
strong advocacy for the resource rent tax (RRT). This
is a tax on cash flows generated by a project above a
specified internal rate of return, forms of which have
been adopted successfully, notably in Papua New
Guinea.
Discussion of the merits and possible drawbacks of the
RRT would be out of place here. The couple of pages
that Walrond and Kumar devote to this form of tax
(pp52-3) seem to me sensible, as are the comments
made by Thomas Walde in the first issue of the
Foreign Investment Law Journal (JCSID Review). My
own belief is that, ex post facto, the impositions on a
successful mine (or oil well) should approximate the
total rental charges achieved by an appropriately
designed and valued RRT, and that the intending
investor should be able to see that that will be the case.
But that is not the same thing as relying too heavily
upon the RRT as the main means of collection. As I
have argued elsewhere, there is much to be said for a
combination of (i) light royalties to catch the poorly
profitable projects - partly on the grounds that some
payment should be made for the alienation of the
resource; (ii) income tax and carried interest (as a form
of participation) to catch projects in the middle range;
and (iii) the RRT to give government a fair share in the
bonanzas, whether these occur from exceptionally rich
deposits or from exceptionally high prices, and as a
form of ensuring the stability of the whole bargain.
And if the project needs an enhanced cash flow in its
early years, like Walrond and Kumar, I believe that
the best form of concession to offer is accelerated
capital allowances. But these are all matters for a
debate that has a lot of running in it yet.
Conclusion
It is 22 years since I first got into the business of trying
to restructure the basis upon which major expatriate
mining corporations operate in developing countries.
Reading these works provokes in me some reflections
as to how the game has gone so far. Not as well as it
might have done, but still not too badly. There have
been profound changes in the relationships between
mining MNCs and host country governments - both
necessary and inevitable after independence. There
have been extensive changes in many countries to the
legal framework within which mining operations take
place. There have been improvements - for which the
Commonwealth Secretariat's Technical Assistance
Group deserves part of the credit - in the technical
design of mineral concession agreements and their
accompanying participation and fiscal regimes. Some
mining MNCs have decided that there are parts of the
world where they will not operate - save perhaps as
managers for a fee - understandably so in view of
their experience, but that is a phase that appears likely
to pass, indeed is passing already as host country
governments and the MNCs learn better both what
each has to offer the other and the imperatives to
which each also has to respond. For many, a
promising revival now awaits nothing so much as a
substantial recovery in demand and prices.
What can we say with confidence in answer to those
questions with which we prefaced this review? Many
parastatals - perhaps most in the mining sector -
have not fulfilled the hopes and expectations that
governments have placed in them. In part that has
been luck; in part that has been due to the weaknesses
in organisation and in the definition of operational
objectives that Radetzki has drawn attention to; in
part it has been the consequences of misguided policy
directives from controlling ministries, inappropriate
tax structures imposed by treasuries, and the
exigencies occasioned by surrounding national
economies in a state of decline or even disintegration.
Indigenisation of management may well have been
achieved more rapidly than otherwise would have
been the case, but the costs in terms of lost production
and profit seem sometimes to have been rather high, a
form of subsidisation of the new privileged classes by
those for whose benefit any additional revenues could
otherwise have been spent. Where equity has been
purchased with funds raised by variable rate loans
and, subsequently, mineral production and prices
have come down while interest rates have gone up
- what might have seemed like reasonable
commercial transactions at the time, from the point of
view of government, have now turned out to be all too
often, ex post facto, transactions which can be seen to
have had a negative present value.
There is one other cautionary lesson that arises from
the argument advanced by Rod Sims. Sims is almost
certainly right in claiming that modern progressive tax
systems which capture for government a major share
of the resource rent are more effective in simple
revenue raising terms than most state mineral
corporations have been. But therein lies a danger. It is
in the nature of such systems that they are highly
geared to profitability - in other words when prices
and profits are high the revenue yield is very good
indeed - but when profits drop back revenues fall
very much more than proportionately. Given the
inclination of governments to allow expenditures to
rise up to the level of revenue, even in good times,
RRT-type systems can confront governments with an
almost impossible task of expenditure contraction
when mineral prices fall. Failure to achieve such
contraction is likely to result in government deficits,
increased borrowing, excessive credit creation, over-
valued exchange rates and that whole familiar range of
problems. The lesson is that RRT-type systems must
be accompanied by a form of mineral revenue
equalisation reserve fund to even out the flow of funds
available to central government. One of the reasons
why Zambia has had much greater problems in
achieving stabilisation than Papua New Guinea is
precisely because Zambia omitted to create such a
fund whereas Papua New Guinea did so.
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